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3GENERALIZATIONS IN NAVAJO
Theodore B. Fernald
This essay investigates the interaction of generic quantification with the interpre­
tations of nominals and predicates in Navajo and in English. For the first time, 
evidence is presented of a distinction between individual- and stage-level predi­
cates in Navajo. Kratzer’s (1988) Prohibition against Vacuous Quantification 
and de Hoop and de Swart’s (1989) Plurality Condition on adverbs of quantifi­
cation are two leading explanations of the well-formedness of generics. Data 
considered here require contextual information to be added to the restrictions of 
quantifiers and they require the Plurality Condition to be extended to the nuclear 
scope in addition to the restriction of a quantifier.
This chapter is laid out as follows. Section 3.1 introduces the basic facts of 
Navajo syntax and provides background on the nominal interpretations with 
respect to (in)definiteness. Two kinds of uses of -go clausal adjuncts are then 
discussed. These adjuncts can be interpreted as reporting that two eventualities 
with overlapping run times occurred or they can be interpreted as generaliza­
tions. Background about the interaction between genericity and the individual- 
/stage-level predicate distinction is presented in section 3.2 along with the 
analyses of Kratzer( 1988) and de Hoop and de Swart (1989). Section 3.3 dem­
onstrates the interaction between genericity and predicate status in Navajo, 
including data that are challenging for both previous analyses. Two new analy­
ses are proposed and evaluated in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents another type 
of Navajo generic sentence involving adverbial quantification. The data in this
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section require an independent modification of the Plurality Condition. Section 
3.6 is the conclusion.
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Basic Navajo Syntax
It is widely known that Navajo sentences need not contain any overt nominal 
expressions. Examples (1) and (2) show that a single verb can be a whole sen­
tence.
(1) Neinitch6. ‘S/he/It is chasing him/her/it.’
(2) Bits’anfk^. ‘I took him/her/it away from him/her/it.’
When sentences contain overt nominals, the word order tends to be SOV (but 
see discussion of the inverse voice construction Willie and Jelinek, this vol­
ume).*
(3) Ndshdoi biih neiniiche. 
wildcat deer 3-3-chase 
‘The wildcat is chasing the deer.’
(4) Naa’oh' yishbezh^f kg’ bits’aik^. (Young and Morgan 1987) 
beans 3-1-cook-REL fire 3-3-1-take-away-ffom
‘I took [the beans I was cooking] away from the fire.’
An additional feature of Navajo is that verbs show “agreement” with every NP 
“argument” in a sentence, as shown in (3) and (4). Quotation marks are used 
here because the analysis of the basic phrase structure of Navajo is currently a 
matter of some controversy. Work following from Jelinek (1989) and Willie 
(1989) assumes that overt nominals are adjuncts rather than being in argument 
positions. The arguments of the verb are taken to be pronouns that have incorpo­
rated into the verb. In other work (e.g., Perkins 1978; Platero 1978, 1982; 
Speas 1990), these morphemes are taken to be agreement markers and overt 
nominals are taken to be arguments. This chapter does not take a position on 
this issue (see Speas and Yazzie 1996 for a paper on Navajo quantification that 
does) but nevertheless aims to contribute to its resolution; the analysis of the 
interpretations of nominal expressions in quantificational sentences is likely to 
be of relevance as this debate develops.
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3.1.2 Definiteness and Indefiniteness in Navajo
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It is widely recognized that indefinite and definite nominals show a contrast of 
interpretation or grammaticality under the scope of a quantifier (see e.g., Krifka 
et. al. 1995, de Hoop and de Swart 1989, Kratzer 1988). Work following Lewis 
(1975), Kamp (1981), and Heim (1982) accounts for these differences by assum­
ing that indefinites have variable reference and that definite nominals do not. 
Because of these differences, it is necessary to review what has been established 
in previous work on nominal interpretation in Navajo. It has frequently been 
observed that, with a few exceptions, bare nouns (those appearing without any 
determiner or focusing particle) are unmarked for number and can be construed 
as definite or indefinite depending on syntactic context. Thus, the nominals in 
(5-7) are may be interpreted as definite or indefinite, although the definite read­
ings tend to be preferred.
(5) Dzaaneez }[(’ yiztal.
mule horse 3-3-Pf-kick
‘The/a mule kicked the/a horse.’
(6) Dzaaneez t({’ deiztal.
mule horse pl-3-3-Pf-kick
‘The/some mules kicked the/some/a horse(s).’
(7) Lf dadijddd.
horse pl-3-fast
‘(The) Horses are fast.’
The verbs in (6) and (7) contain a plural marker indicating that the subject is 
plural and, in (6), that the object may have a plural interpretation.
A nominal in Navajo can be overtly marked as either definite or indefinite 
(Willie 1991). Lei’ marks ’ashkii as indefinite in (8), while the demonstrative 
dii, for example, forces 'ashkii to be definite in (9).
(8) ’Ashkii lei’ ’at’eSd yizts’gs.
boy indef girl 3-3-kissed
‘A boy kissed the/a girl.’
(9) Dff ’ashkii ’at’ded yizts’gs. 
this boy girl 3-3-kissed 
‘This boy kissed the/a girl.’
Another way for an argument to have an indefinite Interpretation is if the verb 
bears a morpheme for an unspecified argument (Willie 1991, Jelinek and Willie
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1993). In such cases, overt nominals are ungrammatical, and the unspecified 
argument must be interpreted as indefinite:
(10) a. ’Ajiy4. ’a-absolutive
3indef-4-eat
‘He’s eating something.’ (YM 1987:67) 
cf
b. *Dah dmilghaazh ’ajiy4-
fried-bread 3indef-4-eat.
‘He’s eating fried bread.’
(11) a. Yah ’ashi’dooIt(. ’(a)d-agentive passive
inside l-3indef-carried
‘I was carried inside by someone.’ (YM 1987:78) 
cf.
b. *Jdan yah ’ashi’dooU{.
J. inside l-3indef-carried
‘John carried me inside.’
Finally, Willie (1991) points out that the external argument of verbs bearing bi- 
third person morpheme must be construed as definite, unless the verb is plural:
(12) ’Ashkii ’at’ded 16i’ bizts’gs.
boy girl indef 3-3-kissed
‘The boy was kissed by a girl.’ (=Willie’s (46))
(13) *’Ashkii Mi’ ’at’ddd bizts’gs.
boy indef girl 3-3-kissed
‘A boy was kissed by the girl.’ (=Willie’s (47))
(14) ’Ashiikd ’at’Sdke dabiihsg.
boys girls pl-3-3-saw
‘The boys were seen by the girls./Some boys were seen by some girls.’ 
(=Willie’s (65a))
Willie (1991) goes on to show that the subject of a ft/-verb cannot serve as the 
restriction of a generic operator. Note that (15) contains a i/-verb in the adjunct 
clause and that it cannot be interpreted as a generalization. Example (16), which 
contains a>^/-verb is grammatical as a generalization.
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(15) Leech^’f m^’ii biitts^^go, bik66’ m'diilwod.
dog coyote 3.3.sees=when 3.follow 3.runs
‘When the dogi was seen by the coyotej, if was chased by if.’ 
(=Willie’s (53))
(16) Ldech^’f m^’ii yiyiittsdehgo, yikeS m'diilwo’.
dog coyote 3.3.sees=when 3.follow 3.runs
‘When a dogi sees a coyote^, if chases if.’ (=Willie’s (52))
3.1.3 Clausal Complements and Modifiers
Various clitics can be attached to the verb at the end of a clause in Navajo to 
allow the clause to be used as a modifier or as an argument (or coindexed with 
an argument, following Jelinek and Willie). Schauber (1975) discusses -go at 
length, arguing that it is a subordinator that has no semantic content of its own.
(17) gives an example of -go attached to a clause denoting the event seen in a 
perceptual report.^
(17) Bill Baa’ neinitcbdego yiihs^. An “argument”
B. B. 3-3-chase 3-1-saw
‘I saw Bill chasing Baa’.’
The next example shows that -go can also be used to derive an adverbial from 
the predicate nizhdnl:
(18) Mary nizhnnfgo French bizaad yee yalti’. An adverbial
M. well-GO French Ianguage3-P speaks
‘Mary speaks French pretty well.’
Clauses bearing the clitic -go can also be used as non-arguments. In the sen­
tences below, the -go clause is adjoined to the main clause at the sentential 
level:
(19) Mary bilff hohpqgo bit hdzh<j.
M. 3-horse exist-GO 3-P I-happy..
‘Mary has a horse and is happy.’ (‘Because Mary has a horse, she is 
happy.’)
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(20) Sarah ’azee’iih'm bit si’ nilfigo aydo dilwo’.
S. doctor 3-daughter 3-be very 3-run
(yitsi ’ for bitsi ’ in some dialects)
‘Sarah is a doctor’s daughter and she runs fast.’
(‘Because Sarah is a doctor’s daughter she runs fast.’)
The examples in (19) and (20) strongly suggest a causal connection between the 
eventualities denoted by the two clauses. The suggestion of causation, however, 
is only implicated (the implicature can be defeated); the interpretation mecha­
nism in the grammar should require only that the denotations of the two clauses 
be logically conjoined. Stump (1985:60ff., 325ff.) discusses certain English 
absolutes in which, he argues, the logical relationship between the adjunct and 
the main clause is underdetermined by the semantics and left to be resolved by 
pragmatic considerations. The same considerations seem to be involved with 
these examples from Navajo. Since the weakest plausible relationship is logical 
conjunction, that is what 1 am assuming for the semantics of (19) and (20). The 
association between the two clauses is in fact a bit stronger than simple conjunc­
tion since, as Eloise Jelinek pointed out to me, the -go clause is presupposed in 
those sentences. It will turn out that this reading, which I will call the conjunc­
tion reading, is always in principle a possibility with -go adjuncts but that other 
readings are sometimes available or preferred for pragmatic reasons.
The causality suggested by (19) and (20) can be overtly entailed by adding 
biniinaa between the two clauses:
(21) ’Ad44d44’ ’aydo deesdoigo biniinaa sbibddgashii ’ahso
yesterday very hot-go because my-cattle all
taab yikai.
into-water got-into
‘It was so hot yesterday that my cattle all got into the water.’ (YM 
1987:795)
(22) Shicb’oozhlaa’ yitnaadgo biniinaa chidinaat’a’f biyid44’
my-elbow 3-1-licked-go becauase airplane out-ffom
ch ’initiizh.
1-fell
‘Because I licked my elbow I fell out of the plane.’(Hale 1972:6)
These sentences have the same structure of a -go clause adjoined to a main 
clause that we have been discussing.
Adjuncts bearing the -go subordinator can also be interpreted as eventualities 
that overlap in time, with the eventuality denoted by the main clause. An exam­
ple of this, in which the verbs are in perfective aspect, is shown in (23).
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(23) Ts6 sdtatgo ch^ dego’.
rock on-l-Pf-stub-go on.the.face 1-Pf-fell.flat
‘I stubbed my toe on a rock and fell flat on my face.’ (YM 1987: 801)
In cases like this, the sentence entails that both eventualities of the speaker 
stubbing his or her toe and falling flat on his or her face occurred.
When the verbs appear in the imperfective, a generalization is often possible:
(24) Mary yidlnhfo hoodiits’a’go yidloh (teh).
M. 3-I-laugh-GO loudly 3-1-laugh (usually)
‘When Mary laughs, she (usually) laughs loudly.’
(25) Ndshddf taj huh neifkaahgo aydo diiwo’ (teh).
wildcat indef deer 3-3-1-chase very run (usually)
‘When a wildcat tracks deer, it [the wildcat] (usually) runs fast.’
(26) £f dzaanSdz tf[’ neintafgo bit hozhgg (teh). 
that mule horse 3-3-1-kick-GO 3-P happy (usually) 
‘When that mule is kicking a horse, it is (usually) happy.’
These have a conditional reading that does not entail that the eventualities de­
noted by either clause hold in the universe of discourse. Thus, for example, (24) 
does not mean that Mary is laughing at the time the sentence is spoken, only 
that, generally speaking, when Mary laughs, she laughs loudly. The ambiguity 
between the conjunction and conditional readings is very similar to what Hale 
(1976) found for several Australian languages that have an adjoined clause type 
that is ambiguous between relative and temporal readings.
3.1.4 Basic Assumptions
In the analysis of (24-26), I will assume the analysis of indefinite descriptions 
that has emerged from Lewis (1975), Kamp (1981), and Heim (1982). The basic 
assumptions are that indefinite nominals are interpreted as restricted variables 
that have no quantlficational force on their own. Adverbs of quantification are 
taken to be unselective quantifiers, binding any fi'ee variable in their domain. 
Quantifiers create tripartite structures as shown in (27).
(27) G [restriction] [nuclear scope] 
adjunct main clause
The interpretations of (24-26) can be derived by positing the optional existence 
of a null generic adverb^ (following among others Stump 1985, Kratzer 1988,
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Diesing 1992, Krifka et al. 1995) and by mapping the adjoined -go clause to the 
restriction of the operator and the main clause to its nuclear scope.
3.2 Genericity and Individual- and Stage-Level Predicates
The distinction between individual-level predicates and stage-level predicates 
(ILPs and SLPs) has been seen to have grammatical reflexes in a wide variety of 
languages, but evidence for the distinction has not previously been sought in 
Navajo. A rough characterization of the distinction is that SLPs are characteris­
tics of individuals that are crucially located in space and time (e.g. kick the 
chair) while ILPs denote properties that have nothing to do with time and space 
(e.g. know French, be human). In English, this distinction is evident in con­
trasts in grammaticality and interpretation. A contrast in grammaticality appears 
in the existential construction (Milsark 1974):
(28) a. There are chairs available. (SLP)
cf. *There are chairs wooden (ILP)
b. There were people sick. (SLP) 
cf *There were people tall. (ILP)
It has been know since Carlson (1977) that there is an interaction between ge­
neric sentences and the distinction between ILPs and SLPs. The following para­
digm, illustrating this interaction, is from Kratzer (1988):
(29) a. *When Mary knows French, she knows it well.
*G [knows (Mary, French)] [knows well (Mary, French)]
b. When a Moroccan knows French, she knows it well.
Gx[Moroccan(x) & knows (x, French)] [knows well (x, French)]
c. When Mary knows a foreign language, she knows it well.
Gx[foreign language(x) & knows (Mary, x)] [knows well (Mary, x)]
d. When Mary speaks French, she speaks it well.
Gi[speaks (Mary, French, 1)] [speaks well (Mary, French, 1)]
e. * When Mary speaks French, she knows it well.
*Gi[speaks (Mary, French, 1)] [knows well (Mary, French)]
Kratzer analyzes (29a) is a case of vacuous quantification, and posits the follow­
ing prohibition to account for it:
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(30) Prohibition against Vacuous Quantification
For every quantifier Q, there must be a variable x such that Q binds an oc­
currence of X in both its restrictive clause and its nuclear scope.
A canonical example of vacuous quantification is shown in (31b) and is con­
trasted with the fully acceptable example in (31a).
(31) a. Every man is such that he is tall, 
b. #Every man is such that John is tall.
Parallel examples in Navajo are shown next:^
(32) a. i’neezfgfj dine t’danfzfnfgo yee hadft’6.
indef-tall-COMP man each-individually 3-P has-characteristics-of 
‘Being tall is a characteristic every man has.’
b. #Man nineeztgff dine t’iimzMgo yee hadft’6.
John 3-tall-COMPman each-individually 3-P has-characteristics-of 
#‘John being tall is a characteristic every man has.’
In Kratzer’s analysis, the reason (29a) is odd is that the generic quantifier has no 
variable to bind in either its restriction or its nuclear scope. When the indefinite 
nominal a Moroccan is introduced in place of Mary, as in (29b), the sentence 
becomes felicitous. The tradition of Lewis (1975), Kamp (1981), and Heim 
(1982) of treating indefinites as restricted variables allows (30) to make the cor­
rect prediction for (29b). (29c) is acceptable for the same reason: a foreign lan­
guage introduces the variable that is bound by the generic operator.
Given this account of (29a-c), it is at first a bit surprising that (29d) is ac­
ceptable: there are no indefinite nominals in the sentence and yet it has the in­
terpretation of a generalization. The crucial difference between (29a) and (29d) is 
that (a) contains an ILP and (d) contains a SLP. This difference leads Kratzer to 
propose that the relevant difference between ILPs and SLPs is that the latter 
introduce a spatiotemporal (or “Davidsonian”) variable into the logical represen­
tation and the former do not. (29d), then, is a generalization about spatiotempo­
ral locations at which Mary speaks French. (29a) cannot be a generalization 
about spatiotemporal locations at which Mary knows French because know 
French is not located in space and time and does not introduce a spatiotemporal 
variable. (29e) is noteworthy for its oddness. Even though the adjunct contains a 
SLP, the main clause does not introduce any variable, so the quantification is 
vacuous.
De Hoop and de Swart (1989) pointed out that certain SLPs sound just as 
odd in wJjcrt-adjuncts as (29a):
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(33) a. *When a Moroccan kills Fido, she kills him quickly.
b. *When Anne makes the film “Dangerous Liaisons,” she makes it well.
What is odd about these sentences is that the predicate in the adjunct clause, in 
its ordinary usage, denotes an eventuality that can take place only once. The 
difficulty these ‘once-only’ examples pose for Kratzer’s analysis is that the SLPs 
introduce variables into the logical representation, so the prohibition against 
vacuous quantification is not violated. De Hoop and de Swart propose that the 
problem with ILPs and with once-only SLPs is that they do not form an ade­
quate restriction for a generalization; forcing them into the restriction results in a 
trivial generalization about only one eventuality. For reasons having to do with 
their analysis of tense and aspect, de Hoop and de Swart reject Kratzer s pro­
posal that ILPs do not have a spatiotemporal argument; their solution allows all 
predicates to have such arguments. The crucial assumption for the interaction of 
the ILP/SLP distinction with genericity is the idea that each ILP and each once- 
only SLP is presupposed to be associated with only one spatiotemporal loca­
tion, while other SLPs are potentially associated with many. This proposal is 
implemented as follows:
(34) Uniqueness presupposition on the Davidsonian argument (de Swart 
1991:59) The set of spatiotemporal locations that is associated with an in- 
dividual-level or a ‘once-only’ predicate is a singleton set for all models 
and each assignment of individuals to the arguments of the predicate.
(35) Plurality condition on quantification (de Swart 1991:118) A Q-adverb 
does not quantify over a set of situations if it is known that this set has 
cardinality less than two. A set of situations is known to be a singleton 
set if:
1) the predicate contained in the sentence satisfies the uniqueness presup­
position on the Davidsonian argument, and
2) there is no (in)definite NP in the sentence which allows indirect bind­
ing by means of quantification over assignments.
These conditions require the restrictions of quantificational adverbs to have car­
dinality of greater than or equal to two. The null generic operator posited for the 
data in (29) is subject to these conditions, as are other adverbs of frequency.
3.3 Navajo Generalizations with ILPs and SLPs
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We now turn to consider Navajo data that parallel the English examples in (29). 
The examples in (36) indicate that Navajo shows a contrast between ILPs and 
SLPs in the interpretation of -go adjuncts.^
(36) a. UMary dinS bizaad bil bddhozingo hastdf bit
M. Navajo language 3-P 3-3-know-GO men 3-P
danilji teh.
pl-3-respect usually
When Mary knows Navajo, men respect her.’^ (ILP)
b. Mary dindk’ehjf yditi’go hastdf bit
M. Navajo 3-speak-GO men 3-P
danilii teh.
pl-3-respect usually
‘When Mary speaks Navajo, men respect her.’ (SLP)
Example (36a) in Navajo seems just as odd as (29a) does in English. As with 
English, adding an indefinite nominal to an ILP makes the generalization read­
ing possible:
(37) a. Saanii dine bizaad bit bdedahdzingo hastdf bit
women Navajo language P-3 3pl-know-GO men 3-P
danil(i teh. (ILP)
pl-3-respect usually
‘When a woman knows Navajo, men usually respect her.’
b. Mary at’^ana’i bizaad bit bddhdzingo hastdf bit
M. foreign languageP-3 3-know-GO men 3-P 
danilii teh. (ILP)
pl-3-respect usually
‘When Mary knows a foreign language, men usually respect her.’
Below is another pair of examples with an ILP in the adjunct.
(38) a. Sarah ’azee’fft’fnfyitsi’ niI[igo aydo dtta’ teh.
S. doctor 3-daughter 3-be very 3-study usually 
Sarah, being a doctor’s daughter, studies a lot.’
#‘When Sarah is a doctor’s daughter, she studies a lot. (ILP)
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b. At’eeke fa’ ’azee’uTMyitsi’ nildgo aydo 6tta’ 
girls indef doctor 3-daughter 3-be very 3- study 
teh. 
usually
‘When a girl is a doctor’s daughter, she studies a lot.’ (ILP)
Consultants indicate that (38a) is acceptable on the first gloss given. The second 
interpretation, like the English gloss, suggests that sometimes Sarah is a doc­
tor’s daughter and sometimes she is not. Example (38b), on the other hand, is 
an acceptable generalization about girls who are doctors’ daughters.
There is a fair amount of speaker variation in judgments among the examples 
in (36-37) with respect to the interpretation of teh. Everyone’s judgments are 
consistent with what I have argued about the basic logic of generics, but how 
that interpretation is expressed syntactically varies. For some speakers, generali­
zations are usually possible without teh, although this is not always the case. 
For them, teh is interpreted as ‘usually’. This dialect appears to have a null ge­
neric quantifier, since a generalization is possible even when teh is not present. 
For other speakers, if teh is not in the sentence, the examples in (36-37) cannot 
be interpreted as generalizations. This dialect has no null generic quantifier (or it 
is ineffective in this syntactic context.) Leh has the interpretation of the generic 
quantifier in this dialect. We will examine the effects of teh in section 3.5.
The data in (36-37), both the Navajo examples and their English counter­
parts, appear to indicate that Kratzer’s prohibition against vacuous quantification 
is too strong. In (36b) and (37b), the main clause appears to contain an ILP. The 
standard English diagnostics for respect indicate that it heads an ILP:
(39) a. Firefighters respect Mary, (no existential reading)
b. *I saw Robin respect Mary. (cf. I saw Robin reach a decision.)
For more on these, see Carlson (1977), Fernald (1994, 2000), Kratzer (1988), or 
de Swart (1991). Unless we take respect to be the head of a SLP, there will be 
no variable in the nuclear scope that also appears in the restriction. The follow­
ing would be the representation for (36b):
(40) G [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)] [Gx [men(x)j [respect (x, Mary)]]
The generalization in the main clause (‘Men respect Mary’) is well-formed: the 
generic operator G in the main clause (the second one in the formula above) 
binds the variable x. The problem arises with the first generic operator in the 
formula since it has no variable to bind. Thus, our assumptions would seem to 
make the incorrect prediction that (36b) should be ill formed.
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3.4 Contextualized Restrictions and Coercion
There are two kinds of solutions to the problem seen in section 3.3. One, as 
already suggested, treats respect as a stage-level predicate in (36b). It would 
analyze the problematic examples as cases in which the main clause ILP has 
been coerced into an SLP, resulting in an inchoative interpretation. The other 
solution admits contextual information into the restrictions of quantifiers. It 
thus departs from classical theories in which there is a pristine mapping from 
syntactic trees to logical representations. However, such a departure is required 
for many ordinary quantificational sentences. Such an account would need to 
allow the missing variable to be accommodated under just the right circum­
stances. We will consider the coercion solution first.
3.4.1 Coercion
When recalcitrant data are discussed in scholarly writing on the ILP/SLP dis­
tinction, one frequently finds a speculation that a predicate of one variety is “be­
ing used” as a predicate of another variety. Perhaps the ILP in (36b) is being 
used as a stage-level predicate. We might think such a thing because respect is 
the sort of thing that ordinarily builds over time. There may be something a bit 
odd about making it depend on particular eventualities of Mary speaking Na­
vajo. Perhaps the oddness results from using respect in a slightly unusual way, 
from coercing it to be a SLP.
All ILPs are stative. Moens and Steedman (1988) pointed out that stative 
predicates can be “coerced” into having a change of state reading in certain syn­
tactic environments.* A change of state predicate, of course, is not stative itself 
since it is telic. Since it is not stative, it cannot be an ILP. But then the predi­
cate must be stage-level. And Kratzer (1988) analyzes SLPs as having a spatio- 
temporal argument. Returning now to the analysis of (36b), if respect is a 
coerced SLP, then we no longer have a problem with vacuous quantification; 
both speak and respect will have spatiotemporal arguments that can be bound by 
the generic quantifier.’ It seems plausible that (36b) has a change of state (in­
choative) interpretation, which may be paraphrased as, ‘When Mary speaks Na­
vajo, men in the area come to respect her’. Since come to respect is stage-level, 
it should introduce a spatiotemporal variable into the nuclear scope. The follow­
ing formula is the result of this assumption along with existential closure of the 
nuclear scope:
(41) Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)] [3x [men(x) & come-to-respect (x, Mary, 1)]]
Chierchia (1992) noted that donkey sentences (of which -go generics are an ex­
ample) can, in principle, have two interpretations, although many individual 
sentences strongly favor one interpretation over the other. Thus, (42) has what
Chierchia calls an a-reading, shown in (b), and the more obvious V-reading 
shown in (c);
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(42) a. When a farmer has a donkey he beats it.
b. Gk [farmer(x) & 3y(donkey(y) & has(x, y))]
[3y(donkey(y) & has(x, y) & beat(x, y))]]
c. Gx [farmer(x) & 3y(donkey(y) & has(x, y))]
[Vy[donkey(y) & has(x, y) & beat(x, y))]]
Example (41) is the 3-reading of (36a), and in fact this is a fairly unlikely read­
ing for the sentence. The more likely V-reading would entail that it is a general 
property of locations at which Mary speaks Navajo that all men at those loca­
tions come to respect her there. This interpretation is shown below:
(43) Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)]
[Vx [men(x) & at(x, l)][come-to-respect (x, Mary, 1)]]
Notice what was needed to produce this formula. In addition to coercion, we had 
to add the contextual information at(x,l) to the restriction of the embedded quan­
tifier. We will see that this is exactly the contextual Information required by our 
other proposal.
Let us now hone our intuitions about (36b) to see whether (43) is a valid 
interpretation of it. It would appear that (36b) conversationally implicates (44), 
but that (44) is not a truth-condition of the sentence.
(44) Men do not always respect Mary.
Note that it is not contradictory to say:
(45) When Mary speaks Navajo, men respect her, and in fact, they always re­
spect her.
This shows that, on at least one reading, (36b) does not entail (44). We can 
show that (44) may be conversationally implicated by (36b) in the right sort of 
context: if the speaker knew that it is always true that men respect Mary then the 
speaker could have said so. But since we take (36b) to be a weaker claim than 
Men respect Mary, the speaker must not have adequate evidence for the latter. 
So by the Maxim of Quantity, we infer that it is not always true that John re­
spects Mary.
The fact that (36b) does not entail (44) has fatal consequences for appealing 
to coercion as an explanation for (36b). At least one reading of (36b) does not 
entail that men ever fail to respect Mary, but (41) does (as long as Mary speaks
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Navajo around men at some time) since it entails a change of state to respect for 
Mary from lack of respect for her. On the other hand, if a context supports the 
conversational implicature that men do not always respect Mary, it might well 
support an inference of (41), and this is why (41) might initially seem to be a 
plausible interpretation for (36b).
Notwithstanding this line of reasoning, Moens and Steedman had solid rea­
sons for positing the existence of inchoative coercion. If we were really con­
vinced that the coerced reading had to be a possible interpretation, we would be 
forced by (45) to believe that (36b) is ambiguous:'® (45) shows that there is at 
least one reading of (36b) that does not entail (44). Thus we conclude that, even 
with the possibility of coercion, (36b) still poses a challenge for our theory 
since it must have an uncoerced reading. In the next section we will develop 
such a reading.
First, however, it should be pointed out that Femald (1994, 1999, 2000) 
predicts an additional coerced reading for this sentence. In this earlier work, I 
claimed that sentences such as Robin is usually intelligent exhibit what I called 
“Evidential Coercion.” Like inchoative coercion, evidential coercion can happen 
when an ILP is used in a spot that is more compatible with a SLP. If a hearer is 
obliged to produce an interpretation for such a sentence, somehow a spatiotem- 
poral variable must be added to the predicate. Below is a formal account of this:
Evidential Coercion: Let a be an ILP with interpretation a', a can be 
used as a SLP with the following interpretation:
Xh Xx 3Q [Q(x,li) & Gy,i[Q(y,l)] [a'(y)]]
A proposition using an ILP a that has been coerced by the above rule will entail 
that the subject has some stage-level characteristic Q at location /, and that, in 
general, if Q holds of someone, that person has the individual-level property a. 
Evidential Coercion is predicted, in principle, to be a successful coercion any­
time an ILP needs to satisfy the Plurality Condition without the help of an in­
definite nominal. Certainly there are particular predicates that are more difficult 
to coerce than others. Nevertheless, we expect that a pair of evidential coercion 
readings (a V-reading and a 3-readlng) should be available for (34b). This read­
ing follows:
(46) a. Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)]
[3x [men(x) & 3Q,1 [Q(x,l) & Gy [31 Q(y,l)]
[respect (y, Mary)]]]]
b. Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)]
[Vx [men(x)] [3Q,1 [Q(x,l) & Gy [31 Q(y,l)]
[respect (y, Mary)]]]]
66 The Athabaskan Languages
By these formulas, (36b) is taken to express the generalization that when Mary 
speaks Navajo at a location, men display some characteristic at that location that 
generally would be taken to mean that they respect her. In other words, the men 
display some outward sign of respect for her.
The same considerations that applied to the readings obtained by Inchoative 
Coercion apply to the readings in (46):
(47) When Mary speaks Navajo, men respect her, but they do not show it.
The fact that (47) is not a contradiction shows at least that there is another read­
ing for (36b). Now we will see how that reading can be predicted.
3.4.2 Contextualized Restrictions
It is widely known that the restrictions of quantifiers need to allow contextual 
information to be added if they are to reflect the intended interpretations of qu- 
antificational sentences." Let us consider some examples:
(48) a. Men respect Mary.
b. Robin always eats steak.
The first example is a generalization ranging over men. However, this would 
never be taken to be a generalization over all men that have ever existed, includ­
ing those that have never even heard of Mary. We would not want to predict that 
a sentence like (a) is always false and therefore unusable. The best we could do 
would be to hope for a Gricean explanation for why it is possible to utter (a) 
informatively. But a Gricean analysis would predict that using (a) would always 
involve flouting the Maxim of Quality. Surely this is not the correct way to go. 
Rather, we must allow context to contribute to the restriction of the quantifica­
tion so that only those men that are contextually relevant count as cases for 
quantification.
The example in (b) is a universal quantification. What is understood to be its 
restriction? It may in fact have an unrestricted reading, which would entail that 
for all spatiotemporal locations in the universe it is the case that Robin eats 
steak. However, again the most plausible use of the sentence is one that is taken 
to be a quantification over contextually relevant spatiotemporal locations. These 
would normally not include locations at which Robin is sleeping, and they 
would certainly not include locations at which Robin does not exist.
Example (36b) is ordinarily taken not to mean that all men in the universe 
respect Mary when she speaks Navajo, but only that the men who are present 
when she speaks Navajo respect her. The restriction of the embedded quantifica­
tion has the contextual information at(x,i) added to it:
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(49) a. Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)]
[Vx [man (x) & at (x, 1)] [respect (x, Mary)]]
b. Gi [speak (Mary, Navajo, 1)]
[3x [man (x) & at (x, 1)] [respect (x, Mary)]]'^
Notice that respect, lacking a spatiotemporal variable, is not a stage-level predi­
cate in this analysis. Since the variable / appears in both the restriction and the 
nuclear scope in (49), the foiinula is well formed, and the interpretation is con­
sistent with our intuitions about the meaning of the sentence.
The contextualization strategy used to produce the formulas in (49) has a 
different effect from what happened with (48a). The latter was well formed prior 
to contextualization, but the formulas in (49) were not, as we have seen. (48b) is 
more like the cases in (49) since little if any of the information that ends up in 
the restriction is represented in the syntax of the sentence.
Clearly a great deal of work needs to be done to see exactly when and where 
contextual information can be added. Here, I will only add the observation that 
it is not always the case that contextual information in an embedded restriction 
can save a generalization the way it seems to in (36b):
(50) #When Mary speaks Navajo, men are tall.
This problem is independent of the issue of contextualization, however. Note 
that example (a) below is just as odd as (50):
(51) a. #When Mary speaks Navajo to Apaches, they are tall.
b. When Mary speaks Navajo to Apaches, they understand her.
I can only speculate about an explanation for this. Somehow, it is less easy to 
see how the height of people could be relevant to Mary speaking Navajo than it 
is to see how people understanding or respecting her could be relevant to those 
events. This suggests that the ways in which relevance is involved in contextu­
alizing the restriction can be fairly complex.
In this section we have seen that two kinds of coercions result in possible 
interpretations for sentences like (36b) but that a pair of noncoerced readings are 
required as well. To produce these readings it was necessary to contextualize the 
restriction of the adverbial quantifier.
3.5 The Quantificational Adverb teh ‘usually’
Kratzer (1988) pointed out that English ILPs sound odd with frequency adverbi- 
als such as sometimes and usually. This is demonstrated by the English coun­
terparts to the Navajo sentences below, which sound equally odd:
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(52) #Jaan nineez leh
J. 3-tall usually 
I #’John is usually tall.’ (ILP)
(53) #Mary din6 bizaad bit bdebozin teh.
M. Navajo Ianguage3-P 3-know usually
#’Mary usually knows Navajo.’ (ILP)
As we would expect, changing one of the arguments to be construed as an in­
definite makes these acceptable:
(54) Ha’a’aahd44’ hastof danineez teh. 
east men pl-3-tall usually
‘Eastern men are usually tall.’ (ILP)
In contrast, SLPs sound perfectly natural with frequency adverbials:
(55) Mary dinek’ehjf yee ydtti’ teh.
M. Navajo 3-P 3-speak usually
‘Mary usually speaks Navajo.’ (SLP)
(56) t(f dzaaneez neintat teh.
That horse mule 3-3-I-kick usually 
‘That horse usually kicks mules.’ (SLP)
In these examples, teh is interpreted as ‘usually’.
Kratzer’s analysis of this is that frequency adverbials must bind some vari­
able, and therefore they are able to quantify over only those clauses which con­
tain indefinite nominals or SLPs. For de Hoop and de Swart, we would think 
that the Plurality Condition in (35) should have a role in the analysis of 
(52-56). Note, however, that (35) is a condition on the restrictions of quantifi­
ers, not on their nuclear scopes. Examples (52-56) are interesting cases since all 
the material in these sentences is mapped to the nuclear scope; the restrictions 
arise entirely from context. Thus, (55) means that usually, in contextually rele­
vant situations, Mary speaks Navajo. Examples (52-56) show that the nuclear 
scopes of adverbial quantifiers are just as susceptible to the ILP/SLP distinction 
as the restrictions are. The question that arises is whether the oddness of (52) 
and (53) can be predicted by the kinds of contexts in which they could be ut­
tered. If so, the Plurality Condition can cover these cases as currently stated. 
The alternative is to extend the Plurality Condition to cover the nuclear scope as 
well as the restriction:
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(57) Plurality Condition on Quantification (modified)
The restriction and nuclear scope of a Q-adverb must not be known to have 
cardinality less than two. A set of situations is known to be a singleton set 
if:
1) the predicate contained in the sentence satisfies the uniqueness presuppo­
sition on the Davidsonian argument, and
2) there is no (in)definite NP in the sentence which allows indirect binding 
by means of quantification over assignments.
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides first evidence for a distinction between individual- and 
stage-level predicates in Navajo. This distinction does not appear to result in a 
contrast in grammaticality along the lines of the English existential construc­
tion, but contrasts are found where a predicate is used to restrict generic quanti­
fiers; as in English, SLPs that are not once-only can restrict a generic quantifier 
without the help of an indefinite nominal, but ILPs cannot.
We have noted that there is some speaker variation with respect to whether a 
null generic operator is available with -go adjuncts and when it is available and 
have left the reasons for this as a subject of further research. For all speakers, fc/i 
is an overt generic quantifier that is subject to the Plurality Condition
This chapter has also argued that sentences like (34b) require contextual in­
formation to be admitted into the restriction of a quantifier if the prohibition 
against vacuous quantification is to account for them. I have also considered a 
number of examples of adverbial quantifiers in simple clauses. Since all the 
overt material in the sentence is mapped to the nuclear scope, a modification of 
the Plurality Condition was needed in which the condition applies to the scope 
as well as the restriction.
In closing, it is worth noting something which will come as no surprise to 
linguists who believe that the semantics of natural language is universal, but 
which may come as a surprise to others: generalizations are formed according to 
the same principles of logic in Navajo as they are in English. We have seen that 
the grammars of both Navajo and English provide ways for generalizations to be 
stated. Moreover, the restrictions (and nuclear scopes) of generic quantifiers 
must delimit a plurality of cases in both languages. It is not simply the case 
that the same tools of logical analysis have been used for understanding English 
and Navajo. Theories of quantification have been useful in explicating the inter­
pretations of sentences, but we have seen something more than that. A violation 
of the Plurality Condition sounds just as odd in Navajo as it does in English. 
The effects described here are thus due to the way speakers of Navajo and Eng­
lish think and are not mere by-products of the tools of analysis. The conclusion 
is that, although there are substantial differences between the grammars of Eng­
lish and Navajo, particularly with respect to clause structure and morphology, 
generalizations are formed according to the same principles of logic.
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Except where otherwise indicated, the data in this paper were elicited by the author. I 
am grateful to Doreena Curley, Lorene Legah, Alyse Neundorf, Paul Platero, and Mary 
Willie for help with Navajo data. Thanks are also due to Eloise Jelinek for comments 
on an earlier draft, and to Bill Ladusaw, Barry Miller, Paul Platero, and the partici­
pants in the Athabaskan Conference on Syntax and Semantics for discussing with me 
the ideas in this paper. I alone am responsible for any errors.
1. Verbs are glossed lO-DO-S-root, consistent with the order in which these mor­
phemes occur. Numbers in the glosses indicate person; Pf stands for perfective, I for 
imperfective, and It for iterative. Postpositions are indicated by P and agree with the 
NPs they appear with. YM abbreviates Young and Morgan.
2. Eloise Jelinek points out that the -go clause could simply be an adjoined 
modifier rather than a complement. If so, (17) would be interpreted as ‘I saw Bill 
when he was chasing Baa”.
3. See Krifka, et al. 1995 for arguments in favor of treating the generic as a binary 
operator rather than as a monadic operator.
4. Chierchia (1992) points out that, in general, determining the restriction of an 
adverb of quantification is more complicated than this, requiring an analysis of in­
formation structure. This issue is not central to this paper, however.
5. Thanks to Paul Platero for these.
6. Certain speakers prefer hastoi to appear at the beginning of the entire sentence 
in these examples.
7. This is grammatical on the conjunction reading: 'Because Mary knows Navajo, 
men respect her.' In some dialects, the argument structure of the main verb in this 
sentence is reversed. For these speakers, the sentences in (36) and (37) should end 
with yit nil(i teh rather than bit danil(i teh.
8. See also Schubert and Pelletier (1989), Krifka et al. (1995), and Fernald (1994, 
1996) for a discussion of these considerations with the ILP/SLP distinction or the 
similar episodic/non-episodic distinction.
9. The Coercion analysis would need to explain why the examples in (39) do not 
indicate that a SEP is present. The answer to this (following Fernald 1996) is that 
coercion does not happen automatically; it needs to be induced by something and 
the interpretations of the examples in (37) are not able to induce it.
10. An alternative to relying on ambiguity we might say that coercion is itself a 
pragmatic inference that can be defeated by an overt statement, as in (45).
11. This is similar to the strategy of Kratzer (1977, 1979) in assuming that con­
versational background contributes significantly to the restriction of modals. Rooth 
(1992) posits a pragmatically-bound variable for his analysis of quantificational 
focus constructions.
12. It is controversial whether the existential quantifier should be taken to have 
a restriction and nuclear scope or just a scope. If the latter is the best course, to get 
the reading in (49b), we would need to allow contextual information to appear in 
nuclear scopes as well as restrictions. If we can avoid this, our theory will have more 
predictive power.
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